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Abstract 
The objective of this study is develop a theoretical model that can evaluate two types of public health expenditures 
on water-borne health risks: water-related municipal services, an ex ante preventative measure against water-borne 
contamination, and medical treatment, an ex post treatment of the water-borne pollutant’s harmful effects on human 
health.  The modeled community can allocate resources in either centralized-municipal water-services, point-of-use 
water-services, or medical intervention, with expenditures subject to a budget constraint.  The movement of a 
water-borne illness through the community is modeled with a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) disease 
framework.  An optimization framework is developed, including a statement of the problem’s Hamiltonian and 
first-order-conditions.  The first-order-conditions are discussed.  Future work includes obtaining a numerical 
solution to the optimization problem.   
Introduction 
Often rural-agricultural communities, in particular those communities along the US-Mexico border that are 
commonly called colonias, are developed hastily and some are not connected to water and/or wastewater services 
that may be considered standard in most parts of the United States  Confounding the issue, local utility providers 
may be unwilling to extend expensive utility services to these communities because the perceived willingness to 
pay for service is low and the perceived tax revenues from municipal annexation of colonias is also low.  Among 
those colonia residents without access to drinking water and sewer service in these communities, hygienic and 
sanitary conditions may become conducive to a variety of illnesses.  Sanitary conditions in these communities may 
account for a portion of the increased levels in the water and sanitation-related illnesses Hepatitis A and Shigellosis 





Figure 1.  Disease prevalence rates for Hepatitis A (a) and Shigellosis (b) from 1992 to 1999 in the four 
counties of the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley and the average prevalence for all of the State of Texas.  
Source(s): USGS 2010a and TXDHS 2007. 
 
High levels of disease impose costs on the colonia residents in terms of reduced quality of life and reduced labor 
value, which include reduced energy levels, lower productivity, and in severe cases, absences from work.  The 
struggles of the colonias in the Valley to attain standard levels of water, wastewater, and other civil infrastructure 
are well documented (Olmstead 2003; Perkins et al. 2001; Reed, Stowe and Yanke, LLC 2001; U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas 1996; Williams 2006).  A survey completed by the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) reported in 2007 as many as 34,924 colonia residents (18% of colonia residents) in Cameron, Hidalgo, and 
Willacy counties did not have access to standard levels of either potable water or wastewater services (Table 1) 
(USGS 2010b). 
With rapidly constructed residential communities like the colonias of the Valley in mind, this paper constructs and 
investigates a theoretical model of a community concerned with public health.  In the model, the public health of a 
community can be enhanced in two ways.  First, the community may engage in water-service infrastructure to 
enhance drinking water access and sanitation in an ex ante attempt to reduce new infections from any contaminated 
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Table 1.     County-level colonias’ populations and percentages of populations in the Texas Rio 
Grande Valley at various states of infrastructure as categorized by USGS (2010b), 2007. 
Cameron  Hidalgo  Starr  Total 
   Pop.  %  Pop.  %  Pop.  %  Pop.  % 
Red
a  4,786  10  17,253  15  12,885  37  34,924  18 
Yellow
b  17,067  36  54,283  48  6,108  18  77,458  39 
Green
c  25,753  54  42,748  37  15,631  45  84,132  43 
Total  47,606  100  114,284  100  34,624  100  196,514  100 
Source(s): USGS, 2010b. 
a Community infrastructure has inadequate potable water supply or inadequate wastewater disposal.
  
b Community infrastructure has adequate potable water and wastewater service, but inadequate solid 
waste services, roads, or drainage.
  
c Community infrastructure has adequate services and infrastructure for potable water, wastewater, solid 
waste, roads, and drainage.
  
 
engage in ex post medical treatment of infected individuals to reduce the disease’s morbidity and mortality.  Water-
service improvements can take two distinct forms: centralized-municipal (CM) services, and point-of-use (POU) 
services.    
Model Description 
Model City  
One way to conceptualize the model is to consider a linear city with increasing distances away from the community 
center associated with increasingly lower  levels of water-service infrastructure.  This linear city is 1 unit long.  The 
areas of this city nearest to the city center,   
 , represent those residents that are connected to CM water-services.  
The neighborhood of   
  represent those residents that use point-of-use (POU) water services, such as in-home 
drinking water filters and home or local septic systems.  The residents which are not in either the CM neighborhood 
or the POU neighborhood are without water service of any kind, i.e.,  1     
      
  .  The division of a continuous 
surface into a few discrete levels is a common method to approximate the true continuous spatial surface (Smith, 
Sanchricho, and Wilen 2009).  In the case of the CM neighborhood, the approximation is particularly reasonable 
because in many communities water-service utilities have clearly defined service-areas beyond which the 
acquisition of water-services is left to individual residents.  The optimal control problem considered in this paper 
will evaluate how large, if at all, the optimal portions of the population  with each type of water-service 
infrastructure given a fixed budget for all community services. 
Disease Dynamics 
A primary issue is the tradeoff between water-service infrastructure and medical care in the presence of water-
borne contamination or disease (hereafter, referred to as disease).  Water-borne disease is captured by considering a 
susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) disease model.  Similar models have been used by economists in a cost-
minimization setting (Goldman and Lightwood, 2002; Zaric and Brandeau, 2001; and Brandeau, Zaric and Richter, 
2003).  Leidner et al.      Water-Services and Water-Borne Illness     Page 5 of 11 
The disease model used in this paper is an adaptation from the SIS model presented in Goldman and Lightwood 
(2002).  As they did,  a population size normalized to one is assumed: 
[1]                1,  
where    is the population portion of susceptible individuals    is the portion of population that is infected, and    is 
the total population level all at time  .  The dynamics of the disease through the population is represented by the 
derivatives of   and   through time: 
[2] 
  
          
                 
 ,  
         
    
         
, 
where   is a population birth rate that is not affected by the proportion of people who are infected.  This is a 
reasonable assumption for many water-borne diseases, i.e., most are non-sterilizing and symptomatic for only a few 
weeks.  Take, for example, E. coli outbreaks; they do not likely affect birth rate of an entire population.  The 
transmission function is:     
 ,  
  , where   
  represents the level of CM water-services, and   
  represents the 
portion of population that has access to POU water-services.  Depending on particular diseases, increasing levels of 
  
  and   
  will reduce the population’s average transmission rate.  Therefore, the transmission function should 
have negative derivatives with respect to   
  and   
 : 
[3] 
     
 ,  
  
   
    0, and 
[4] 
     
 ,  
  
   
    0. 
Just as the portion of individuals in the susceptible class is reduced by transmissions, those who are infected, and 
survive, rejoin the susceptible class at a recovery rate equal to the function     
  , where   
  is the level of medical 
treatment deployed to the total population, with   
  constrained to be less than or equal to the infected class.  
Therefore, the recovery function should have a positive derivative with respect to   
 : 
[5] 
      
   
  0. 
The denominator of     consists of changes made to the size of total population, which is normalized to one.  As 
before,   is the birth rate,   is the natural death rate, and   is the disease-induced death rate, which only affects the 
infected class.  Invoking equation [1] (i.e.,      1     ), equation [2] can be rewritten in terms of only the infected 
class: 
[6]      
                         
 ,  
             
    
         
. 
Invoking the assumption that population birth rate is equal to the natural death rate (i.e.,      )  leads to further 
simplification of the susceptible population’s state equation: 
[7]      
        
 ,  
             
    
     
. 
Once again, invoking equation [1], equation [7] can yield the state equation for the infected class: 
[8]                1 
        
 ,  
             
    
     
 
         
 ,  
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Equation [8] defines the class dynamics that will be used later in the optimal control problem.  Next, the 
transmission and recovery functions are defined further to give an explicit relationship between water-service 
infrastructure, medical treatment, and the dynamics of the water-borne disease through the population.  The 
transmission function is defined as follows: 
[9]     
 ,  
         
        
       1     
      
  , 
where the natural, or spontaneous, transmission rate    of the disease only affects the portion of the population that 
receives neither CM or POU water-services.  Similarly,    and    are the transmission rates associated with 
residents on CM and POU water-services, respectively.  Depending on the disease under consideration, the values 
of the three transmission rates may be different or the same.  A typical case, for a disease such as cholera, the 
following conditions may hold:  
[10]             ,  and        . 
The right-hand side of [10] is the reason for the negative signs in the partial derivatives in equations [3] and [4].  In 
this case, CM and POU water-services provide the same level of protection against cholera and, assuming    is 
quite small, the only portion of the population with significant exposure to cholera are those individuals without 
any form of water-services.  Additionally note if water-service is sufficiently high  (i.e.,  1     
      
   is small), 
then the effect of the higher, natural transmission rate will be negligible. 
The recovery function is defined in a similar way: 
[11]     
               
         
 , 
where   
  is the portion of the total population that receives medical treatment.  Since giving medical treatment to 
individuals who are not infected makes no sense, a reasonable constraint is:   
      ; and at full treatment of all 
infected individuals:   
      .  The two recovery coefficients are defined as follows:    is the natural, or 
spontaneous, rate of recovery; and    is the medically-enhanced recovery rate.  The derivative of the recovery 
function, equation [5], is positive precisely because the medically-enhanced recovery rate is greater than the 
spontaneous recovery-rate (i.e.,       ). 
Abatement Strategies 
This section introduces more specifics about the three possible disease abatement strategies, starting with CM 
water-services (  
  .  Since CM water-services have, relative to POU water-services, dynamic properties (i.e. must 
be constructed, maintained through multiple time periods, and can depreciate), CM water-services is represented in 
the model by a second state variable with the following derivative with respect to time: 
[12]    
   
     
  
     
       
 , 
where   
 is the level of build out, with full-infrastructure at   
    1;   is a constant component of CM water-
service cost;   
  is a control variable, representing an administrator’s expenditures towards water infrastructure; and 
  is a depreciation term used to represent maintenance on existing infrastructure.  The most important implication 
for the first term in the CM water-services state equation (i.e.,   1     
      ⁄    
   is that expenditures on water 
supply improvements exhibit decreasing marginal returns.  By inverting [12], an expenditure, or cost, function can 
be generated: 
[13]   
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  . 
Expenditures (  
 ) to CM water-services are applied to either new additions (i.e.,    
      1     
   ⁄  ) or 
maintenance on existing infrastructure (i.e.,    
      1     
   ⁄  ).  Both the new addition and the infrastructure 
repairs are weighted by a factor (i.e.,     1     
   ⁄ ) that results in increasing marginal costs.  With this 
specification, marginal costs increase to infinity as the level of CM water-service approaches 1.  This assumption is 
reasonable for cities with dense central populations and more sparse populations on the outskirts and rural areas, 
where costs to bring water services to the more rural residents would be increasing with their distance from the city 
centers; and ultimately, someone in the population will be so far from the city center such that to make a CM 
service connection would be prohibitively expensive .  An alternative specification for this problem may include a 
CM water-service with high fixed costs and decreasing marginal costs.  Such a specification would be consistent 
with the literature on natural monopolies that gives credence to the public-ownership of many municipal water-
service providers. 
The other two controls in this model, POU water-services and medical treatment, are not represented as state 
variables.  This assumes that POU water-services and medical treatment cannot be stored across time periods.  
Alternatively, this means POU water-service equipment and medical treatment are completely non-durable, or their 
depreciation rate is set at 100%.  The expenditure specifications for POU water-services and medical treatment are 
defined as follows: 
[14]   
        
 , and 
[15]   
        
 , 
where   
   and   
  are, respectively, the expenditures applied to medical treatment of the infected individuals and 
the expenditures applied to POU water-services;    and    are constant unit-costs; and   
 , which was introduced 
earlier, is the portion of the total population receiving medical treatment and has constrained to be less than the 
proportion of infected individuals.  For this to be a reasonable method to depict cost of a medical treatment, the 
total population must remain constant.  That is a tenuous requirement because equal rates for the population’s 
natural births and deaths were defined previously.  Therefore, if both virulence and the infected class are greater 
than zero, then, with no other influences to the population size, the population is in decline.  As total population 
declines, the cost of giving medical treatment to a fixed portion of the total population should decrease, i.e., giving 
ORT to 10% of 100 should be cheaper than giving ORT to 10% of 1,000,000.  Imposing a constant total 
population, while including the possibility of virulence deaths, implies that those that die from the disease are 
immediately replaced by immigrating susceptible individuals.  This is argued as a reasonable assumption in 
locations where the total population level is by-and-large unaffected by this disease.  In these locations, other 
factors such as immigration, war, deadly car accidents, or even other diseases are dictating the total population 
level, not water-borne illness.  Another way to think about this could be that population birth rate is essentially 
equal to the sum of population natural deaths and virulence deaths (i.e.,            ).  In this way, the maximum 
population level is maintained over time, where the population level is some carrying capacity that is constrained 
by some other resource(s) or factors. 
The costs of providing POU water-services (equation [14]) and medical treatment (equation [15]) are constant 
across the spatial dimension, unlike the costs of CM water-services.  This assumption seems reasonable, but may be 
revisited at a later time.  Many arguments that favor applying increasing or decreasing costs through space onto the 
POU water-service cost structure may also be applied to the costs structure of medical treatment.  The nature of 
acquiring or distributing POU water-services and medical treatment are very similar, i.e., a resident can either travel 
into a city to purchase one or the other, or the social-planner can pay for the delivery of one or the other. Leidner et al.      Water-Services and Water-Borne Illness     Page 8 of 11 
The Social Planner’s Problem 
In this model, the social planner’s objective is to minimize the damages from a particular water-borne disease with 
a fixed annual expenditure.  The damages from a given disease are defined as follows: 
[16]                     , 
where the damage from the disease are separated into two components, called the morbidity damage (    ) and the 
mortality damage (     );    and    are, respectively, the per-unit costs of contracting a disease and dying from the 
disease.  The final equation included in the model is a budget constraint on expenditures, ensuring that the social-
planner spends exactly the full budget: 
[17]   
      
      
      , 
where    is some exogenous level of expenditure.  The administrator is given the task of optimally dividing up 
funds equal to    towards the goal of minimizing the damages caused by water-borne disease.  The value of   , 
essentially the size of an administrator’s budget determined by either a higher-ranking administrator or some 
legislative action, could vary across time periods.  Certainly this is most likely in many nations and regions.  In this 
model,the issue of fluctuating levels of    is not addressed; hence,   is considered as a constant through time.  
Mathematically, the problem of the administrator is: 
[18] min                  
 
     
Subject to: 
[18.1]      
          
      
         
    
                   
       
  
     
 
[18.2]    
   
     
  
     
       
  
[18.3]   
        
  
[18.4]   
        
  
[18.5]   
      
      
       
[18.6]   
       
[18.7]   
    1     
  
[18.8]   
 ,  
 ,  
    0. 
The objective function and many of the constraints have been discussed previously.  Two additional constraints that 
require further explanation are equations [18.6] and [18.7].  Equation [18.6], if binding, suggests universally-
distributed medical services to the infected proportion of the population.  Equation [18.7], if binding, suggests 
universally distributed water services to the entire population, both susceptible and infected.  Water services may be 
either CM or POU.  Each of these constraints imposes two important conditions on the social planner’s problem for 
the context of many water-borne illnesses.  Equation [18.6] ensures the portion of the population receiving medical 
services does not exceed the portion that is infected.  In other words, healthy individuals are not given medical 
treatment.  Equation [18.7] ensures that the portion of population receiving POU does not exceed the portion of the Leidner et al.      Water-Services and Water-Borne Illness     Page 9 of 11 
population that does not have CM water services.  In other words, individuals can have either CM water services or 
POU water services, but not both.     
Hamiltonian and First Order Conditions 
This section develops a Hamiltonian for the social planner’s problem (equation [18]).  From the Hamiltonian, a set 
of first order conditions are generated and the economic implications of several of the first order conditions are 
discussed.  By first substituting constraints [18.3] and [18.4] directly into the budget constraint (equation [18.5]), 
the problem is shortened, but qualitatively unchanged, and yields the following Hamlitonian: 
   [19]                  
      
   
          
      
         
    
                   
       
  
     
  
      
  
     
  
     
       
   
      
           
        
      
   
      
         
   
     
  1     
      
  . 
The following first-order conditions are generated from this Hamiltonian: 
  [20.1] 
  
   
       
       
  
       
    0  
  [20.2] 
  
   
       
   
             
     
      
        
    0  
  [20.3] 
  
   
       
   
     
     
        
      
    0  
  [20.4] 
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  [20.6] 
  
   
              
        
      
    0  
  [20.7] 
  
   
            
    0 
  [20.8] 
  
   
       
  1     
      
  . 
Some basic insights can be gained from interpretation of this set of first order conditions.  Rearranging [20.1] 
generates: 
[21]   
      
    
     
  , 
where, in optimality, the marginal value to the objective function of another unit of water supply infrastructure 
(  
 ), or the shadow price of water infrastructure, is exactly equal to the shadow price of the budget constraint (  
 ) 
weighted by the marginal cost of an addition to water infrastructure (    1     
   ⁄  .  Similar results are found for 
POU services: 
[22]   
   
             
     
      
        
 ,  
where the shadow cost of an additional infected individual (i.e,   
 ) multiplied by the difference in a susceptible 
individual’s infection rate with POU services (i.e.,           1        1        ⁄ ) is exactly equal to the shadow 
price of the budget share multiplied by the unit cost of another unit of POU (i.e.,   
   ) plus the shadow price of 
switching an individual from POU to CM services (i.e.,   
 ).  Similarly, for medical intervention: 
[23]   
   
     
     
        
      
 , 
where the shadow cost of an additional infected individual (i.e,   
 ) multiplied by the difference in that infected 
individual’s recovery rate with medical intervention (i.e.,              1        ⁄ ) is exactly equal to the shadow 
price of the budget share multiplied by the unit cost of another individual’s medical intervention (i.e.,     
 ) plus 
the shadow price of providing medical intervention to only infected individuals (i.e.,   
 ).  Here, as with CM and 
POU water services, the rule of setting marginal costs equal to marginal benefits holds. 
Summary and Future Directions 
The next steps for this research are to calculate a numeric solution using suggested values for the model’s 
parameters (i.e., rates of transmission, recovery, virulence, etc.) based on several water-borne diseases, potentially 
including: cholera, arsenic poisoning, and E. coli.  Overall, the goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical model 
related to water-borne illness that included the abatement strategies of increasing one of two kinds of water services 
or medical services for a modeled community.  Equating the marginal costs and marginal benefits of each 
abatement strategy is shown to hold in optimality.  There are examples in South Texas where not all of the residents 
have potable water delivered to their households.  This situation may result in water-contamination problems that 
may eventually end up causing water-related illnesses.  With the onset of illness, there are costs related to medical 
treatment for some cases as well as loss of time on the job plus potential cross contamination to the food industry.  
Assisting communities manage and view these issues in a comprehensive manner is one goal of this effort. Leidner et al.      Water-Services and Water-Borne Illness     Page 11 of 11 
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